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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
Volume 46, Number 2, 1971
NEGLIGENCE AND LIABILITY WITHOUT
FAULT IN TORT LAW
Cornelius J. Peck*
It is frequently assumed that with a few exceptions the principles
of negligence comprise the field of tort law, and that fault is the most
common basis for determining liability for harmful conduct. The
space devoted in most law school torts casebooks suggests to students
and future lawyers that negligence is the dominant principle of tort
law.' The emphasis given the subject by teachers, stimulated by the
intellectual challenges of defining proximate cause or establishing
standards of care, further impresses the importance of negligence prin-
ciples upon each class of law students. Moreover, most of the tort
cases litigated are in fact decided pursuant to principles of negligence,
largely because of the litigation-spawning capacity of automobile ac-
cidents.2 Though these are changing times, the concept persists that
what now exists has always been. However, a survey of tort law pro-
duces a somewhat different view, and discloses a surprising number
of instances in which liability is imposed without fault.
The conclusion reached by most scholars is that until the 19th cen-
tury a person whose actions caused harm to another was in most
situations held responsible for that harm simply because he had acted.
* Professor of Law, University of Washington; B.S., Harvard, 1944; Certificate,
Harvard Business School, 1945; LL.B., 1949. This article first appeared in U.S. DEP.
1 'IMsp., TnE ORIGM AND DEVEOpmENT or TnE NEGLIGENCE AcrroN-AuToMoBsr
INSuRANcE Am CoAmONs=o STUDY (1970), and is reprinted in substantially the
same form.
1. Prosser devotes in excess of 500 of 1150 pages in his casebook to negligence con-
cepts, W. PROSSER & Y. SMnxN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS (4th ed. 1967) ; W. SEAVEy,
P. KEETOx & R. KEETON, CASES ON TORTS (2d ed. 1964) devotes about 450 of its 1043
pages to negligence principles; and C. GREGORY & H. KALVEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
TORTS (1959) likewise gave about 450 of 1299 pages to negligence concepts.
2. 2 F. HARPEn & F. JAars, THE LAw or TORTS § 11.3, Supplement to Volume 2,
Comments to 11.3 n.1, to 11.3 n.8 (1956); O'Connell, Taming The Automobile, 58
Nw. L. Rev. 299, at 303-04 (1963).
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Holdsworth tells us that this was the case both with respect to early
Anglo-Saxon law' and the Mediaeval Common Law.' Wigmore earlier
summarized the primitive German doctrine that "The doer of a deed
was responsible whether he acted innocently or inadvertently, because
he was the doer .... ", This absolute responsibility, without regard to
blame, persisted until the early 1500's, when the primitive notion was
abandoned in favor of permitting a defendant to exempt himself from
liability by showing that he was without blame even though he had
acted voluntarily.6 Street agreed that for several hundred years the
conception of negligence was unknown to the law of trespass; a de-
fendant was liable if it was shown that damage had been done by the
direct or immediate application of force, without regard to whether
or not he was negligent.7 Justice Holmes was persuaded that policy
and consistency required rejection of the rule of strict liability, but
recognized that the theory enjoyed the support of some lawyers of his
time, and that the common law probably followed such a rule during
what he called a period of dry precedent." Scholars today agree that
a rule of strict liability prevailed at the early stages of development
of the common law, usually rendering an actor liable if he in fact
caused injury to another.9
Escape from the rule of strict liability evolved and developed slowly,
in typical common law fashion. There are a number of detailed accounts
of this development. 10 Prominent among the early decisions is The
Case of Thorns," in which an action for trespass to real property was
brought against a defendant who had cut a hedge of thorns, some of
which fell upon plaintiff's land. While holding for the plaintiff, one of
3. 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 51 (3d ed. 1923).
4. 3 id. at 375-82.
5. Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History, 7 HAiRv. L. REV. 315, 317
(1894).
6. Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History-Ill, 7 HARv. L. REv. 441,
at 442-44 (1894).
7. T. STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABIITY 74-78 (1906).
8. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 89 (1881).
9. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 12.2 (1956); W. PROSSER, THE
LAW OF TORTS 144 (3d ed. 1964); J. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 107, 290 (3d ed.
1965).
10. Winfield, The Myth of Absolute Liability, 42 LAW Q. REv. 37 (1926); Winfield,
The History of Negligence in the Law of Torts, 42 LAW Q. REv. 184 (1926); Wigmore,
Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History-ll, 7 HARV. L. REv. 441 (1894); 0.
HoiaMs, THE COmmON LAW 85-88 (1881).
11. 1466 Y.B. 6 Ed. 4, f.7a pl. 18.
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the judges noted that the defendant had failed to allege that he could
not have acted in any other way, or that he had done all in his power
to keep the thorns from falling on plaintiff's land. This observation
suggests that establishing such facts might have constituted a valid
defense. One hundred and fifty years later a similar suggestion was
made in a case holding liable a soldier whose gun accidentally dis-
charged and injured the plaintiff.' 2 But the examples given--'as if a
man by force take my hand and strike you, or if here the defendant
had said that the plaintiff ran across his piece when it was discharging,
or had set forth the case with the circumstances so as it had appeared
to the court that it had been inevitable, and that the defendant had
committed no negligence to give occasion to the hurt"--indicate that
liability would have been imposed upon an actor guilty of much less
than what is today required to establish negligence.
And so things continued until the 19th century, with liability in tres-
pass being imposed upon actors who had caused harm in a series of
cases suggesting that inevitability of the accident and lack of any fault
upon the part of the defendant would have constituted justification
and a defense against liability.'3 Finally, three American courts, relying
in large part upon dicta from earlier cases, announced the proposition
that liability could not be imposed unless the actor were guilty of some
fault or neglect.' 4 Of the three, the decision of the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts in Brown v. Kendall5 became the most famous, and is
now considered the leading case establishing the necessity of proving
negligence in order to impose liability for accidental injury. Perhaps
the decision has gained that position because of the esteem enjoyed by
its author, Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw; more likely, its prominence
derives from the fact that it clearly imposed the burden of proving
negligence upon the plaintiff rather than leaving the absence of negli-
gence something to be proved by the defendant, as the other two
decisions suggested.'6 Several years later, in England, comprehensive
12. Weaver v. Ward, 80 Eng. Rep. 284 (K.B. 1616).
13. See the cases set out in the Appendix to Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious
Acts: Its History-ll, 7 HARV. L. REV. 441, at 456-63 (1894). See also, 0. HoLaMEs,
Tax CommoT LAW 85-88 (1881).
14. Vincent v. Stinehour, 7 Vt. 62 (1835); Harvey v. Dunlop, 39 N.Y.C.L.R. 193
(1843); Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850).
15. 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850).
16. In Vincent v. Stinehour, 7 Vt. 62, 65-66 (1835) the court said: "To prevent any
227
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reviews of precedent led to a clear statement that, where an act causing
harm is neither intentional nor negligent, there will be no recovery,
even though trespass would have been the right form of action if one
had been maintainable.17 But even as late as 1959 an English trial
court was called upon to determine that a complaint did not state a
cause of action where it alleged an injury caused by the defendant
without specifying that the harm was either intentionally or negligently
inflicted.'
As early as the 14th century, however, liability for causing harm
could be established in an action of trespass on the case by showing
that the conduct of the defendant was negligent. This action was de-
vised in order to provide a remedy for harm caused by misfeasance
in the performance of an obligation which had been undertaken. 9 In
time, trespass on the case came to lie for the doing of any unlawful
act, provided the damage sustained was "consequential" rather than
"immediate.1 20 At that time it was fatal error to proceed by case if the
harm had been immediately caused by the defendant; 2 however,
shortly before the American courts developed the modern negligence
principle, an English court decided that a plaintiff might make negli-
gence the ground of an action on the case even where the injury had
been "immediately" caused by a negligent act.22 In effect, one could
waive the trespass and sue for negligence. The effect of the mid-19th
century American decisions was to merge the substantive law of tres-
pass and case, and to impose upon plaintiffs who relied upon trespass
abuse of this protection [against liability for harm involuntarily occasioned], a person is
accounted negligent or careless, and blame is imputed to him, if he does not use an
extraordinary degree of circumspection and prudence, greater than is commonly prac-
ticed, and if he might have prevented the accident." In Harvey v. Dunlop, 39 N.Y.C.L.R.
193, 195 (1843), the plaintiff had argued that the onus lay on the defendant to show
that the injury had not been done wrongfully or carelessly. The highest New York
court agreed, but concluded that the jury might have reached such a determination
on the evidence.
17. Holmes v. Mather, [1875] L.R. 10 Ex. 261; Stanley v. Powell, [1891] 1 Q.B. 86.
18. Fowler v. Lanning, [1959) 1 All. E.R. 290 (Q.B.). Probably plaintiff's counsel
was attempting to put on the defense the burden of showing freedom from fault.
19. 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY op ENGLISH LAW 429-34 (3d ed. 1923).
20. Blackstone, J., in Scott v. Shepherd, 1773. 3 Wils. 403, 95 Eng. Reprint 1124; 1 J.
CHITrY, PLEADINGS 148 (16 Am. Ed. 1883).
21. Day v. Elwards, 5 I.R. 648, 101 Eng. Rep. 361 (K.B. 1794).
22. Williams v. Holland, 131 Eng. Rep. 848 (C.P. 1833).
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theory the same burden which they formerly would have had to carry
in an action on the case 3
Why the change took place must, of course, remain a matter of
speculation. It has been suggested that Chief Justice Shaw may have
been motivated by a desire to make the risk-creating enterprises of a
developing industrial economy less vulnerable to liability than they
had been under the earlier common law.2 4 This suggestion has been
countered with the observation that Brown v. Kendall, which Shaw
used as the vehicle for changing the law, involved not industry but
instead the actions of private persons engaged in separating two fight-
ing dogs. 5 It seems unlikely that Chief justice Shaw shrewdly selected
the case in order to disguise the ends to be served by changing the
law; but it seems equally unlikely that he could have written the deci-
sion without considering what the contemporary conditions of society
suggested as appropriate standards for allocating responsibility for un-
intentionally caused harms.
Indeed, the common law trespass rule was probably well suited to
the conditions which prevailed during its evolution. Most energy
sources at that time were either human or familiar domestic animals;
the implements used in labor and recreation were relatively uncompli-
cated devices operating on elementary mechanical principles. One who
directly or immediately harmed another by his active conduct probably
had departed from community standards of behavior much in the same
way that one who is negligent today departs from the standard of the
reasonably prudent man. Proof of "immediate" causation was then a
satisfactory standard for allocating responsibility for harm. It did not
have a disruptive effect upon society, and did not deter or misdirect
otherwise desirable economic activity.
The development of industry and transportation using steam and
other sources of power, and the development of new products and de-
vices, changed the situation. One need only read a description of the
operation of steam locomotives prior to adoption of the air brake to
23. Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. Rv. 359, 366
(1951).
24. Id. at 368.
25. Roberts, Negligence: Blackstone to Shaw to ? An Intellectual Escapade In A
Tory Vein, 50 Copi= L.Q. 191, 205 (1965).
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realize what costs might have been imposed upon railroads if liability
for harm were to be determined by the common law trespass rule: 26
Down to the year 1868 the brake system remained very much as
it was in 1830 when railways were first adapted to commercial
operation. Even though detailed improvements covering struc-
tural items had been incorporated, the essential principles were
the same. Those in charge of the locomotive had no direct control
over the brake manipulation of the vehicles comprising the train.
Communications between engineman on the locomotive who senses
the danger and the brakeman in the cars who drew up the cables
was effected by whistle signals in case of sudden emergency. The
first action was to signal danger and to this signal the train crew
was instructed to respond with celerity. Each operation required
time and every second of time represented many feet of space.
Moreover, about the only safety measures which the railroads could
use at crossings were warning signals by whistle and bell. 7 As one
commentator colorfully put it some time ago:
28
Early railway trains, in particular, were notable neither for speed
nor safety. They killed any object from a Minister of State to a
wandering cow, and this naturally reacted on the law.
Predictably, the reaction of the law was not strict condemnation of
this activity which offered escape from the slow, uncomfortable and
jolting transport by stage over mud-filled roads,29 and which promised
development of the nation's rich resources deposited over thousands of
miles of virgin territory. The negligence standard provided a legal
environment in which rail transportation could grow and prosper. It
aided other branches of industry and commerce as well.
The judicial response to the question of the liability of one who
causes harm by handling a new and relatively unknown material sug-
gests a similar adaptation of law. The Nitroglycerine Case involved an
explosion which occurred soon after "a gentlemen by the name of
Noble" [sic] suggested that nitroglycerine might be used for blasting
26. Simcox, SAFETY 3N EARLY A.wa cAN RAILWAY OPERATIONS: 1853-1871 (1936),
quoted in Malone, The Formative Era of Contributory Negligence, 41 ILL. L. REv. 151
at 161 (1946) [hereinafter cited Malone].
27. Id.
28. Winfield, The History of Negligence in the Law of Torts, 42 L.Q. REv. 184, 195
(1926).
29. See Malone, supra note 26, at 153-54.
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purposes.3 0 Employees of the defendant express company had under-
taken with hammer and chisel to open a case, from which some un-
identified "sweet oil" was leaking. The explosion which followed did
severe damage to the building in which the express office was located.
The defendants were not held liable for the harm done, even though
it resulted "immediately" from the actions of the employees. Chief
Justice Shaw's opinion in Brown v. Kendall provided the basis for
holding that the directness or remoteness of the consequences of the
defendants' act related only to the proper form of action, and not to
the basis of liability. Negligence was the standard by which liability
was to be determined. Coupled with the then prevailing notion that a
manufacturer was not liable absent privity of contract,31 the decision
significantly aided preparation of the legal environment for an economy
which would be producing and using new and unfamiliar products
whose composition or principles of operation were not generally known.
The restructuring of the legal environment for the industrial age
was not accomplished solely through reformulation of the rule con-
cerning liability for trespass. As Professor Malone has effectively
demonstrated,3 2 the concept of contributory negligence as a bar to
recovery rose to prominence in response to the need for a legal system
compatible with the demands of a growing industrial economy. The
unimpressive opinions in Butterfield v. Forrestor,'3 uniformly recog-
nized as the fountainhead of contributory negligence theory, could
hardly have prompted such widespread proliferation of the doctrine
had it not been the case that some additional bar to recovery was con-
sidered necessary and appropriate to the times. The entire population
stood to benefit from the workings of an industrial economy, and
society could not afford to burden itself with compensating those in-
dividuals who were so unfortunate as to be injured accidentally by
an instrument of progress3 4
Thus it appears that a significant change in tort law was made by
abandonment of the strict liability rule of common law trespass, and
substitution of the principles of negligence law in cases involving un-
30. 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 524, 529 (1872).
31. Wimterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
32. Malone, supra note 26.
33. 11 East 59, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809).
34. See L. GamsN, TEAmc Vicm es; TORT LAW Am INsum ac 33-34 (1958).
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intended consequences. That this change took place within the last
one hundred and fifty years is in itself evidence that strict liability is
not a principle alien to Anglo-American tort law. Perhaps even more
persuasive evidence is the fact that strict liability is applied as the
principle for determining responsibility for much harmful conduct
within the area of tort law. Strong eddies and cross-currents developed
in response to the changes in liability for unintended consequences,
and, to extend the metaphor, it seems possible that the tide has begun
to turn.
An example of strict liability derived from the early common law,
but still of vitality, is the rule imposing liability upon one who inten-
tionally enters onto land in the possession of another, even though
under a reasonable mistake.35 Of course, a distinction exists between
consequences which are intended, though brought about by mistake,
and consequences which are unintended. But the significant point is
that liability may be imposed for trespass even though a reasonable
man might have made the same mistake. Moreover, the liability of a
trespasser extends to all harm which he in fact causes to the land, the
possessor, or members of the possessor's household, without regard to
whether the trespasser acted in a way which was intentionally wrong-
ful, reckless, or negligent.36 Perhaps the preservation of this rule of
strict liability can be attributed to our unexamined retention of the
early common law zeal for protecting interests in land; or perhaps
no social purpose equivalent to that of freeing industry from judicial
restraints has been advanced on behalf of trespassers to real property.
The consequence is, at any rate, that one may be held liable for harm
caused without fault other than entry based upon a reasonable mis-
take .37
35. 1 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 164 (1965); J. FLrMWG, THE LAW OF
TORTS 77-80 (3d ed. 1965); 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, Ti LAW OF TORTS 12-13 (1956);
W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 74 (3d ed. 1964).
36. 1 RESTATEMENT (SEcON) OF TORTS § 162 (1965); J. F.EMMnG, THE LAW OF
TORTS 38 (3d ed. 1965); 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, ME LAW oF TORTS 29 (1956); W.
PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 67 (3d ed. 1964).
37. Illustration 2 to § 162 of 1 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS is as follows:
2. A is driving his car along the highway in a neighborhood with which he is
unfamiliar. He asks B to direct him to a certain town. B tells him that he can
take a short cut through a private road over which the public is not accustomed
to travel, which B asserts to be upon his own land but which, in fact, is on the
land of C. While driving carefully along the road, A runs over D, C's three-year-
old child, who suddenly dashes out from the bushes which border the road. A is
232
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Strict liability is still imposed upon one who removes the naturally
necessary lateral or subjacent support of land in the possession of
another thereby causing subsidence of the land, both for damages to
the land and for any damage to buildings or artificial conditions
thereon. 8 In fact, Tentative Draft Number 15 of the Restatement of
Torts Second recently proposed to increase this protection for support
of land by imposing strict liability for subsidence of land caused by per-
sons otherwise privileged to withdraw subterranean water, oil, minerals,
or other substances from under the land 9 Liability for harm caused
by the subsidence of land which would not have taken place but for
the weight of buildings upon it is determined by principles of negli-
gence,4 0 but the total picture is one of broad exposure of land exca-
vators to strict liability. Again, the reason for the strict liability may
be an unexamined retention of the common law's zealous protection of
interests in land, but the result is that one may be held liable for
unintended consequences caused without fault other than that of being
the actor.
The early common law also recognized a strict liability for harm
done by trespassing animals, although liability apparently could be
avoided by surrender of the animals.41 In time, this liability became
personal to the possessor of the animals, and thus became more nearly
a rule of strict liability comparable to those discussed previously. The
applicability of this strict liability rule to conditions in the United
States was a matter of some doubt during the formative stages of this
nation, but today, even in jurisdictions in which it was judicially re-
jected, it has since found legislative acceptance in various forms of
fencing statutes.42 Once again, the appropriateness of strict liability
seems to have turned upon how well the particular rule has suited the
needs of the community, rather than upon any philosophical conclusion
as to whether the possessor of an animal, for example, was guilty of
fault.
subject to liability to D and to C.
38. 4 RESTATEMENT o Toars §§ 817, 820 (1939); 1 F. HARPER & F. JAmas, THE LAW
O TORTS § 1.27 (1956).
39. RE TATEMENT (SEcoND) or TORTS §§ 818 (Tent. Draft No. 15, 1969).
40. 4 RESTATEMENT or TORTS §§ 819, 821 (1939).
41. 0. HOLIES, THE COmmON LAw 1520-23 (1881). Wigmore, Responsibility for
Tortious Acts: Its History, 7 HtAv. L. REv. 315, 325 et seq. (1894).
42. See 1 F. HARPER & F. JAx-s, THE LAw or Tom § 14.9 (1956).
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There are other rules derived from early common law precedents
which also may appropriately be considered rules of strict liability
within the body of tort law. For example, a bona fide purchaser of
stolen property is strictly liable to the true owner for its value, regard-
less of the care and prudence he may have exercised in ascertaining the
title of the vendor.43 This liability is imposed without regard for the
relative fault of the owner in exposing the goods to the possibility of
conversion.44 Another rule of law holds a bailee liable for misdelivery
of property, regardless of his good faith or his freedom from negli-
gence.45 Moreover, in order to avoid an otherwise insurmountable
obstacle to recovery, the usual rule is that a bailor may establish a
prima facie case simply by proving that he delivered the property, and
that the bailee either failed to return it, or returned it in damaged
condition.46 The same reasoning underlay the common law rule, now
embodied in the Interstate Commerce Act, making a carrier liable for
damage to goods transported unless it can show that the damage was
caused solely by an act of God, the public enemy, the shipper himself,
a public authority, or by the inherent nature of the goods.47 The con-
sequence is that a carrier may be held liable even though it was guilty
of no negligence. Except where modified by statute, a similar strict
liability has been imposed upon hotels and innkeepers for the loss or
destruction of the goods of guests.4" It might be objected that these
are rules of property law rather than tort law; but such an argument
smacks too much of the fine analysis formerly applied in determining
the correct form of action for obtaining redress for harmful conduct.
If instead one may avoid that perspective of the law, it seems quite
certain that the strict liability effect of the respondeat superior doctrine
is one of the most important principles of liability for tortious conduct.
Early commentators described it as such,49 and the fact that the doctrine
43. R. BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 231 (2d ed. 1955) [hereinafter cited
as BROWN]; See UNIFORm COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-403.
44. BROWN, supra note 43, at 241-42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 234 (1965).
45. BROWN, supra note 43, at 351; 1 F. HARPER & F. JANXS, THE LAW OF TORTS
156 (1956); W. PROSSER, TiE LAW OF TORTS 88 (3d ed. 1964).
46. BROWN, supra note 43, at 359-75; RESTATEIENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328A,
comment b (1965).
47. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Elmore & Stahl, 377 U.S. 134 (1964).
48. BROWN, supra note 43, at 481-87. Innkeepers are afforded a greater opportunity
than carriers to escape liability by showing freedom from negligence.
49. Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History-l, 7 HARv. L. REv. 383
(1894); 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COm NTA MiES 429-32 (17th ed. 1830).
234
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seems to fit more neatly into the law of agency is no reason for de-
emphasizing its operative effects in the law of torts. The liability of an
employer for the tortious conduct of his employee is a strict liability
imposed without regard to the fault of the employer. It makes no dif-
ference how careful the employer 'is in recruiting his workers, how
carefully he trains them, or how carefully he supervises their activ-
ities. If an employee commits a tort in the course of his employment,
his employer is liable.
Another rule of liability without fault which is frequently consid-
ered an element of agency law, but which is also clearly a principle for
determining liability for tortious conduct, is that imposing liability for
harm done by carefully selected independent contractors performing
non-delegable duties."° This liability is not simply a development of
the strict liability imposed for engaging in abnormally hazardous activ-
ities, for it extends to activities which are not so classified.51 Other
principles of vicarious liability, such as the family car doctrine,52 may
likewise be considered to permit the imposition of liability for tortious
conduct without proof of fault. While it is true that in many of these
situations, someone has been at fault in bringing about the harm suf-
fered, for present purposes the significant point is that liability may
be imposed on one who was without fault.
The employment relationship offers other illustrations of liability
without fault. For example, the obligation imposed in admiralty upon
an employer of seamen, to furnish maintenance and cure for seamen
who fall sick or are injured in the service of the vessel, is a strict
liability imposed without regard to the fault of the employer.53 Far
from meeting disapproval in modem times, this principle has been
codified by the Jones Act," which broadens the rights of seamen.
Moreover, the enactment of workmen's compensation acts throughout
the United States reflects the conclusion that imposition of strict liabil-
50. See RESTATE=mET (SEcom) or TORTS §§ 416-27B (1965).
51. See RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) op TORTS § 417 (1965) (Work done in a public
place) § 418 (Maintenance of Public Highways) §§ 419, 421 (Repairs which a lessor
is under a duty to his lessee to make) § 422 (Work on buildings and other structures on
land) § 425 (Repair of a chattel supplied or land held open to the public as a place
of business).
52. 2 F. HAPWR & F. JAmES, THE LAW Or TORTS 1419-24 (1956).
53. See Calmar Steamship Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525 (1938); The Osceola, 189
U.S. 158 (1903).
54. 46 U.S.C. 688 (1964).
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ity upon employers is an appropriate way to deal with industrial
accidents."5
Defamation is, of course, an intentional tort insofar as it requires
an intention to publish the defamatory statement, but it is often illus-
trative of liability without fault. Except for constitutionally protected
statements concerning public officials, public figures, and matters of
public interest,56 liability may be imposed because a statement, inno-
cent on its face, was rendered defamatory by facts not known to the
defendant nor discoverable by him in the exercise of reasonable care.5"
Liability may likewise be imposed even though the defendant did not
intend to defame the plaintiff, and had no reason to know that his
statement would be defamatory. 8 In short, one who publishes a defam-
atory statement will be held liable to one injured without regard to
whether the publication could be said to be the product of fault.
An innocent misrepresentation made by a party to a business trans-
action may also give rise to liability irrespective of the good faith or
reasonable belief of the defendant.5" Prosser lists eighteen jurisdictions
which have adopted this rule of strict liability, and suggests that in
other jurisdictions such a rule is in fact applied, although disguised in
the more traditional language of fraud through the use of presumptions
or fictions concerning the defendant's state of mind. 0 The rule may
also have been made effective with respect to the sale of securities by
Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, and Rule 10b-5 of the
55. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, T= LAW OF TORTS 730-33 (1956); W. PROSSER, THE
LAW OF TORTS 554-58 (3d ed. 1964).
56. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Time, Inc. v. Ill, 385
U.S. 374 (1967); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
57. 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 5.5 (1956); W. PROSSER, THE
LAW oF TORTS 791-92 (3d ed. 1964). A leading example is a Scottish case, Morrison v.
Ritchie & Co., 39 Scot. L.R. 432 (1902), in which the defendant published as a routine
social item a false report that plaintiff had become the mother of twins. Plaintiff had
been married only a few weeks, but this was unknown to defendant. Defendant was
held liable. Care or the lack of it went only to affect damages.
58. F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 57, at § 5.7 (1956); W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF
TORTS 791 (3d ed. 1964). A leading example is the case of Jones v. E. Hulton & Co.,
[1909] 2 K.B. 444, aff'd [1910] A.C. 20, in which defendant published what it intended
to be a fictitious account of immoral behavior of one Artemus Jones on the beach at
Dieppe. A real Artemus Jones was held entitled to recover despite defendant's lack of
intent to defame any living person.
59. 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THm LAW OF TORTS § 7.7 (1956).
60. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 724-29 (3d ed. 1964).
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Securities Exchange Commission's Regulations pursuant to the Secur-
ities Act of 1934.61
One of the more spectacular changes in tort law in recent years has
been the adoption of a rule imposing strict liability upon sellers of
defective products for the harm caused by the defect. Soon after the
leading decision of the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors,62 this rule of strict liability was adopted in many
other jurisdictions. 3 So swift was this change to the rule of strict
liability that the reporter and council for the Restatement (Second) of
Torts urged abandonment of a section approved in 1962 limiting such
strict liability to products designed for intimate bodily use, and adop-
tion of a broader version applicable to all products so that the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts would not be out of date when published.6
The broader version later obtained the approval of the Institute, and
now appears as Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
This strict liability has been further extended to defects in housing
produced by a mass developer of housing,6 5 to the lessor of a rental
truck,66 and to the manufacturer of a demonstrator model for injuries
received before purchase.67 This general and rapid acceptance of strict
liability reflects a judicial consensus that the rule is more appropriate
to the present day economy than was the old rule, which imposed a
burden upon the injured party to prove negligence on the part of
the manufacturer or seller of the product.
There remains to be noted the strict liability imposed upon those
who engage in extra-hazardous or abhormally dangerous activities.
This is probably the type of strict liability which most readily comes
to mind when the subject of strict liability is mentioned, perhaps be-
61. See Meisenholder, Scienter and Reliance as Elements in Buyer's Suit Against
Seller Under Rule lob-5, 4 CORP. PRAc. Commsr. 27 (1963).
62. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
63. E.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897
(1962); Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81 (1963);
Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967); Ulmer v. Ford Motor Co.,
75 Wn. 2d 522, 452 P.2d 729 (1969). See PROSSER, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict
Liability to the Consumer), 50 MmN. L. Rxv. 791 (1966).
64. RESTATEmT (SEcoND) op ToRTs § 402A (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
65. Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
66. Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing and Rental Service, 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769
(1965).
67. Delaney v. Towmotor Corp., 339 F.2d 4 (2d Cir., 1964).
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cause several generations of lawyers have now been exposed to torts
courses in which this type of liability was discussed as a contrast to
basic negligence principles. Traditional discussion of the subject begins
with analysis of the decision in Rylands v. Fletcher,68 even though the
opinions in that case reveal that the judges had no intention of chang-
ing the law or providing remedies beyond those which had existed for
centuries under English law. In any event, the principle of liability
without fault applied in that case had a ready adaptability to cases in-
volving harm caused by the powerful devices and products of an indus-
trial age. Although a number of courts have avoided specific application
of Rylands v. Fletcher to problems of this sort, in fact a principle of
strict liability for extra-hazardous activities has become accepted doc-
trine in American law.69 The original Restatement of Torts incorporated
the principle of strict liability for what were called "ultrahazardous
activities. ' 70 With a change of terminology to "abnormally dangerous
activities"' 71 and recognition that the liability should attach even though
the activity might be perfectly safe if the utmost care were used,72
this principle will be carried into the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
where it will be extended even further to cover harm caused to property
or persons on the ground by the ascent, descent or flight of any air-
craft.73
In a number of respects, even liability imposed on a negligence basis
is in fact a liability without fault. The standard of the reasonably pru-
dent man is an objective standard which ignores many considerations
which would be involved in determining whether there was moral or
ethical fault on the part of the actor.74 Deviations from that standard
are made at the peril of the actor, as are the deviations from community
standards which take place when one engages in abnormally dangerous
activities. Certainly there is no moral fault on the part of a man who
for more than 30 years has driven carefully and without accident, but
68. 3 Hurl. & C (Ex. 1865); [18661 L.R. 1 Ex. 265; [18681 L.R. 3 H.L. 330.
69. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAmES, T E LAW OF ToRTs § 14.4 (1956); W. PROSSER, TE LAW
OF TORTS 523-32 (3d ed. 1964).
70. 3 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 519-24 (1938).
71. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 519 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
72. Id. at § 520.
73. Compare RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 520A (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1966)
with § 520A (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1965) and § 520A (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
74. See Seavey, Negligence, Subjective or Objective, 41 HAgv. L. REv. 1 (1927).
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who, distracted by concern for the health of his hospitalized wife, drives
through a stop sign and collides with a person who had the right of
way. Yet such a man would be deemed negligent because, considering
only certain aspects of his conduct, he created unusual and unreason-
able risks. Even insane persons are liable for negligently inflicted harm
and their conduct is judged by the standard of the reasonably prudent
man, although it is beyond their power to meet that standard.75
At times, allocation of the burden of proof in negligence cases may
also impose liability upon one whose fault has not in fact been estab-
lished. Thus the established principle that an unexcused violation of
a criminal statute constitutes negligence per se places the burden of
establishing excuse or justification on the defendant, with liability fol-
lowing if such is not established."6 Even when the violation of the
statute can never be excused-as with the Federal Safety Appliance
Act,7 for example-liability may be imposed although a total evalua-
tion of the cirucumstances would lead to the conclusion that there was
no fault. In some jurisdictions, the effect of res ipsa loquitur is to create
a presumption of negligence which stands unless rebutted,7 and hence
supports liability where in fact there was no fault. Where the more
usual version of the doctrine is followed, and res ipsa loquitur simply
creates a permissible inference of negligence,79 there is still the possi-
bility that a jury will draw that inference where in fact there was no
negligence.
CONCLUSION
This review of the field of tort law indicates that if regard is given
to the various types of problems encountered, rather than the number
of cases pending on court dockets, strict liability is applied more often
than negligence as the principle which determines liability. It is neither
a mere vestige of primitive law, as indicated by its recent judicial
75. RESTATENmT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B (1965).
76. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAxrs, THE LAW OF TORTS § 17.6, at 1010-11 (1956); W.
PRossER, THE LAW oF ToRTs § 35, at p. 202 (3d ed. 1964).
77. O'Donnell v. Elgin J. & E.R.R., 338 U.S. 384 (1949), rehearing denied 338 U.S.
945 (1930).
78. 2 F. HAPER & F. JAmS, THE LAW OF ToRTS § 19.11 (1956); W. PRoSSER, THE
LAW OF TORTS, 232-39 (3d ed. 1964).
79. See authorities in note 78, supra.
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and legislative applications, nor a new and untried development. It is
a principle with adaptability to serve the needs of society in a variety
of situations. Apparently no set formula can be derived as to when strict
liability constitutes the appropriate principle of liability, but some
observations may be made about certain common features of the situa-
tions in which strict liability is applied.
One of these common features is that the person harmed would en-
counter a difficult problem of proof if some other standard of liability
were applied. For example, the disasters caused by those who engage
in abnormally dangerous or extra-hazardous activities frequently de-
stroy all evidence of what in fact occurred, other than that the activity
was being carried on. Certainly this is true with explosions of dynamite,
large quantities of gasoline, or other explosives. It frequently is the case
with falling aircraft. Tracing the course followed by gases or other
poisons used by exterminators may be difficult if not impossible. The
explosion of an atomic reactor may leave little evidence of the circum-
stances which caused it. Moreover, application of such a standard of
liability to activities which are not matters of common experience 0 is
well-adapted to a jury's limited ability to judge whether proper pre-
cautions were observed with such activities.
Problems of proof which might otherwise have been faced by ship-
pers, bailors, or guests at hotels and inns certainly played a significant
role in shaping the strict liabilities of carriers, bailees, and innkeepers.
Problems of proof in suits against manufacturers for harm done by
defective products became more severe as the composition and design
of products and the techniques of manufacture became less and less
matters of common experience; this was certainly a factor bringing
about adoption of a strict liability standard.81 Superior knowledge and
difficulties of proof are frequently mentioned as justifications for appli-
cation of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine.
Another common feature of situations in which strict liability is im-
posed is that the conduct giving rise to liability is not one which it
would be socially desirable to prohibit or enjoin, so that the giving of
a remedy to a plaintiff threatened with harm must be delayed until
80. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 520 (1939).
81. See, e.g., Traynor, J., concurring in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d
453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (194).
240
Vol. 46: 225, 1971
Liability Without Fault
harm has actually occurred. This is certainly the case with abnormally
dangerous activities, the keeping of domestic animals, the removal of
lateral or subjacent support for land, the publication of statements or
views which may be defamatory, and the flight of aircraft over land.
Another very important common feature is that strict liability serves
a compensatory function in situations where the defendant is, or
through the use of insurance may become, the financially more re-
sponsible person. Certainly this underlies the strict liability of the
respondeat superior principle, the family car doctrine, and other
vicarious liabilities. It is also true of a manufacturer's liability and the
liability of one engaging in abnormally dangerous activities, and is
generally true of common carriers and innkeepers (rather than shippers
or guests), as well as those who engage in excavating activities which
remove lateral or subjacent support. The consequence of imposing such
liability in these situations is usually to pass the cost of the beneficial
activities on to those who enjoy its benefits.
A number of the situations in which strict liability is imposed involve
a type of conduct which can be defined with sufficient precision to
ensure that application of a strict liability principle will not produce
miscarriages of justice in a substantial number of cases. This is ap-
parent with respect to those who engage in abnormally dangerous activ-
ities, manufacturers, persons who remove lateral or subjacent support,
the keepers of domestic animals, shippers, bailees, innkeepers, bona
fide purchasers of stolen property, publishers of defamatory statements,
and persons violating statutes.
If the activity involved is one which can be defined with sufficient
precision, that definition may serve as an accounting unit to which the
costs of the activity may be allocated with some certainty and pre-
cision. Precise definition of an accounting unit makes it possible to use
actuarial techniques for accumulating loss experience, thus rendering
the activity appropriate for service by insurance institutions.
Of course, not all activities to which these general observations might
apply are now governed by a rule imposing strict liability for harm.
Automobile accident claims settlement and litigation is a prime ex-
ample of an area to which the principle of strict liability might be
applied with benefit, but in which negligence standards still prevail.
The problems of proof involved in automobile accident litigation
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under a negligence standard are so great that it is only blind optimism
in a large number of cases to hope that what in fact occurred will be-
come known. Modern highway traffic situations may attach critical
significance to such factors as lines and markers painted on a road sur-
face, relative positions of rapidly moving vehicles, presence and color
of steady or flashing lights, and very short time intervals. On-the-
scene observations are ordinarily made by untrained persons, who
were not prepared for the event which transpired. The event may
have been so shocking that it had effects upon both their psyche and
memory. Moreover, the determination is not based upon what these
untrained persons in fact observed, but instead turns upon what they
remember of what they observed perhaps two or three years earlier.
Even these memories do not control the final judicial decision, be-
cause that depends upon what jurors can remember perhaps two or
three days after having heard the poorly remembered and conflicting
accounts of witnesses, who may have been neither articulate nor pre-
cise in their use of language. As with a number of other situations in
which strict liability provides an appropriate rule, one may be able
to say confidently only that the parties were engaged in a particular
activity-i.e., the use of motor vehicles.
Given the values of our society, high speed traffic is a necessity
of the day. It cannot be prohibited, and those threatened by it must
await harmful injury before seeking a remedy. The owner of an auto-
mobile has by its acquisition demonstrated a financial capacity mak-
ing it possible for him at least to purchase insurance to absorb any
loss caused by its operation. So much of our affluence is devoted to
automobiles, there is little doubt that, taken as a whole, the activity
can afford to bear all the costs of harm which are factually connected
with it. If insurance is made compulsory its cost becomes a cost of
transportation, and thus is passed on to those who benefit from the
use of automobile transportation. The activity involved-the use of
motor vehicles-is one which can be defined with sufficient precision
to ensure that strict liability will not be imposed unjustly in any sig-
nificant number of cases. Finally, it is an activity for which there is a
wealth of statistical data, making it possible to use the actuarial tech-
niques which facilitate the use of insurance.
It should be no surprise, then, that in recent years a number of
proposals have been made to deal with the problem of distributing
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the costs of automobile accidents upon some basis other than fault.82
This is not the proper occasion to review or evaluate these various
plans, or to determine whether the optimal scheme would be to impose
strict liability without regard to fault or to utilize some type of acci-
dent insurance. But it may be said with a certain confidence that, in
the foreseeable future, some principle or principles of liability with-
out fault will substantially replace the principles of negligence law
in automobile accident claims settlement and litigation. When this
occurs, the principles of negligence will have lost the dominant posi-
tion they now occupy in tort law due to the frequency of automobile
accidents.
82. R. KEEToN & J. O'CoNN=EL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAmImC VscimT (1965);
L. GRax, TRAmc VIcruMs: TORT LAW AND INSURANcE (1958); Morris and Paul, The
Financial Impact of Automobile Accidents, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 913 (1962); A. EHEnN-
ZwEIG, FULL AID INSURANCE FOR THE Mt c ViCTI (1954). For a description of
these and other proposals, see R. Keeton and J. O'Connell, supra, at 124-219. For a
contrary view, see W. Bu-m & H. KA vEv , PUBLic LAW PER SP EcvES ON A PR VATE
LAW SUBjECT (1965), first published in 31 U. CHI. L. R v. 641 (1964).
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